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JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in determining that, as a matter of law, Park City 
staff decision to issue a building permit constituted a "Final Action" for purposes of 
appeal? [Record ("R.") at 219-222.] 
2. Did the District Court err in determining that, as a matter of law, the Foxes' 
"Notice of Appeal" was untimely? [R. at 218-222,] 
3. Did the District Court err in determining that, as a matter of law, the 
decision of the Park City Board of Adjustment was not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal? 
[R. at 222-223.] 
The lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of 
Appellees/Defendants is reviewed for correctness and the trial court's legal conclusions 
are given no particular deference. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, P.C. v. Young, 2004 
UT 26, If 10,496 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (2004); Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All of the following provisions are set out verbatim in the addendum to this brief: 
• Park City Land Management Code ("LMC") §15-1-18 
• LMC §15-1-12 
• LMC § 15-15-1.90 
• Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-706 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises over a challenge to a building permit issued by 
Defendant/Appellee Park City ("Park City") to Defendant/Appellee Legacy Development 
Group, LLC ("Legacy Development") for the construction of three residential buildings 
located at approximately 1243 Empire Avenue and 1240 Lowell Avenue (the "Subject 
Property"). [R. at 1-2.] On or about May 6, 2005, Legacy Development applied for a 
building permit with the Park City Community Planning Development Department (the 
"Department") for the construction of the three buildings. [R. at 2.] Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Bret and Tawnya Fox (the "Foxes") own a home within 300 feet of the Subject Property 
located at 1226 Lowell Avenue, Park City, Utah. [R. at 3, 136.] Park City's Land 
Management Code ("LMC") contains the relevant rules and regulations for construction 
activities within Park City. [R. at 3, 136.] The building permit issued by the Department 
authorized Legacy Development to construct the Buildings in violation of the applicable 
LMC height restrictions and without Legacy Development obtaining a variance or 
providing neighboring property owners, like the Foxes, with the required notice and 
public hearing to determine whether a variance to exceed the height restrictions should be 
granted. [R. at 3, 137.] 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Upon learning of the three buildings' violation of the LMC height restrictions, 
Bret Fox inquired of the Department what he must do to bring this issue to Park City's 
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attention. [R. at 138, f 16.] Pursuant to the instructions of the Department, on January 
19, 2006, within 10 days of learning of the three buildings' height violations, the Foxes 
filed an appeal with the Park City Planning Commission (the "Planning Commission 
Appeal"). [R. at 138, f 16.] The form of the appeal followed the instructions given to 
Mr. Fox by the Department and was accepted without a filing fee. [R. at 138, ffi[ 16-17.] 
After Park City requested that the Foxes submit a filing fee in order to have the Planning 
Commission Appeal heard, the Foxes submitted the same on April 25, 2006. [R. at 140, 
Tf 22.] On June 14, 2006, the Planning Commission held the hearing on the Foxes' 
Planning Commission Appeal. [R. at 140, f 24.] Without considering the merits of the 
Foxes' appeal, the Planning Commission held that it lacked jurisdiction because the 
appeal was not timely filed. [R. at 140, f 24.]. Undeterred, on June 26, 2006, the Foxes 
timely filed an appeal with Park City's Board of Adjustment ("Board of Adjustment") 
and paid the required appeal fee. [R. at 7, % 46; 140, f 25.] On August 24, 2006, 
mirroring the decision reached by the Planning Commission, the Board of Adjustment 
held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide Foxes' appeal on the merits based on the Foxes' 
alleged untimely appeal. [R. at 141,127.] 
Based on the Board of Adjustment's decision, the Foxes timely filed their Petition 
for Review of Board of Adjustment Order and Complaint ("Petition") in the Third 
Judicial District Court on September 22, 2006. [R. at 1-12.] The Petition sought a 
reversal of the Board of Adjustment decision, a declaratory judgment against Legacy 
Development for its violation of the LMC height restrictions, and injunctive relief againsl 
Legacy Development to bring the three buildings within the applicable height restrictions 
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[R. at 1-12.] On February 6, 2007, Park City filed a motion to dismiss Foxes' claims, 
essentially arguing that the Foxes' alleged untimely appeal with the Planning 
Commission barred recovery. [R. at 58-65.] On February 15, 2007, Legacy 
Development filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Building Permit 
constituted a "Final Action" and the Foxes' appeal was untimely, effectively barring any 
possible recovery. [R. at 66-74.] On February 15, 2007, Legacy Development filed a 
joinder in Park City's motion to dismiss [R. at 75-76], and on February 21, 2007, Park 
City filed a joinder in Legacy Development's motion for summary judgment. [R. at 77-
78.] On February 21, 2007, the Foxes filed their motion for summary, arguing that the 
appeal to the Planning Commission was timely and Legacy Development violated the 
LMC by constructing the three buildings in violation of the applicable height restrictions 
and without the required notice and variance. [R. at 126-153.] The Foxes also filed a 
memorandum in opposition to Park City's and Legacy Development's respective motions 
on February 21, 2007. [R. at 133-153.] Following briefing, a hearing was held before 
the Honorable Bruce Lubeck on June 4, 2007. [R. at 206-207.] 
C. Disposition by Trial Court. 
On June 6, 2007, the trial court issued its Ruling and Order, wherein it granted 
Park City's motion to dismiss, granted Legacy Development's motion for summary 
judgment, and denied the Foxes' motion for summary judgment. [R. at 208-226.] 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about May 6, 2005, Legacy Development applied for a building 
permit with the Department for the construction of three residential buildings located at 
approximately 1243 Empire Avenue and 1240 Lowell Avenue. [R. at 2, ^ f 7.] 
2. The Foxes own property at 1226 Lowell Avenue, Park City, Utah, which is 
within 300 feet of the Subject Property. [R. at 136, ^  2.] 
3. Park City's Land Management Code ("LMC") contains the relevant rules 
and regulations for construction activities within Park City. [R. at 3, ^ f 11.] 
4. By its application, Legacy Development sought to construct the three 
buildings to heights substantially in excess of the relevant height restrictions outlined in 
the LMC. [R. at 3, K 10; 137, f 5.] 
5. Under the LMC, single family residences and duplexes are limited to a 
height of 27 feet above the lowest of Existing or Final Grade. [R. at 4, ^ 19; 147-148.] 
6. Under the LMC, a triplex, as opposed to a single family residence or 
duplex, has a higher height restriction. A triplex can be constructed to 35 feet, plus 5 feet 
for the roof structure, above the lowest of existing or final grade. [R. at 4, ^ f 18; 148.] 
7. Under the LMC, a triplex is defined as a single "Building containing three 
(3) Dwelling Units." [R. at 4, ^ 20; 148.] 
8. Under the LMC, a single Building is a separate or detached structure. To 
be a part of the same structure, the structure must be connected by at least one common 
party wall. [R. at 4, f 21; 148.] 
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9. Building C is not connected physically in any way to either Building A or 
Building B. [R. at 4,1f 24.] 
10. None of the buildings can be characterized as a triplex under the LMC. 
Rather, Building C is a single family residence and Buildings A and B are either single 
family residences or a duplex. [R. at 4, f 25.] 
11. Rather than use the Existing Grade or Final Grade to determine the three 
buildings' heights as required by the LMC, the Department used a newly invented 
"Interpretive Grade," which was arbitrarily determined by drawing a straight line from 
the top of the lot to the bottom of the lot. [R. at 5, f 28; 138 at ^ 14.] 
12. The LMC neither authorizes the use of an "Interpretive Grade" nor 
authorizes calculating a building height from a grade determined by drawing a straight 
line from the top to the bottom of the lot. [R. at 5, f^ 29.] 
13. The three buildings exceeded the maximum allowed height under the LMC 
for either a single family residence, a duplex, or a triplex, due to the tallest point of the 
three buildings being in excess of 48 feet from Final Grade. [R. at 5, f 30.] 
14. Legacy Development failed to seek a variance from Park City for the 
proposed building heights, to provide requisite notice of the application for the building 
permit, or to request a public hearing, whereby the surrounding neighbors could 
participate in determining whether a variance to exceed the height restrictions should be 
granted to Legacy Development. [R. at 5-6, ffij 31-35; 137, ffif 6-7.] 
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15. Rather, at the request of Legacy Development, on or about July 14, 2005, 
the Department issued Building Permit No. B05-10308 for the three buildings (the 
"Building Permit"). [R. at 3, % 14.] 
16. No notice was given of the issuance of the Building Permit. In particular, 
no posting or publication occurred nor was notice provided to property owners within 
300 feet of the Subject Property, including the Foxes. [R. at 137, ^ f 9.] 
17. Following the issuance of the Building Permit, construction was 
commenced on each of the three Buildings. [R. at 137, ^ f 10.] 
18. Since no notice of the building permit was provided, during the ten days 
after the Department issued the permit, the Foxes were unaware of the existence of the 
permit or the fact that Legacy Development's contemplated three buildings would violate 
the height restrictions. [R. at 138, ^ 15.] 
19. Upon learning of the buildings' potential violation of the LMC height 
restrictions after construction of the three buildings was commenced, Bret Fox inquired 
of the Department what he must do to bring the issue to Park City's attention. Mr. Fox 
was told by the Department that he must appeal the Department's decision to issue the 
building permit to the Park City Planning Commission (the "Planning Commission"). 
Pursuant to the instructions of the Department, on January 19, 2006, within ten (10) days 
of his learning of the three buildings' violations of the height restrictions, the Foxes filed 
a "Notice of Appeal" to the Planning Commission (the "Planning Commission Appeal"). 
The form of the appeal and the manner of its filing were pursuant to the instructions 
given to Mr. Foy by the Department. [R. at 138, ^  16.] 
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20. At the time of filing the appeal, the Foxes were not told a filing fee was 
required, and Park City accepted the Planning Commission Appeal without the filing fee. 
[R. at 138-39, H 17.] 
21. Not hearing anything from the Planning Commission for approximately 
two months, the Foxes engaged counsel and had their counsel inquire about the status of 
the appeal by a letter dated March 16, 2006. [R. at 139,1j 18.] 
22. On April 5, 2006, Patrick Putt, Planning Director for the Department, wrote 
to the Foxes' counsel and informed them that the Department had no jurisdiction over the 
Planning Commission Appeal, but if the Foxes wanted the matter to be heard by the 
Planning Commission, the Foxes should pay a $100 fee or request a waiver. [R. at 139; f^ 
19.] 
23. Concerned that the Department responded to the letter and not the Planning 
Commission to whom the appeal was directed, on April 11, 2006, the Foxes' counsel sent 
a letter to Mark Harrington ("Harrington"), Park City's attorney, informing Harrington 
that the Department, not the Planning Commission, responded to the appeal, that the 
appeal was to the Planning Commission, and requested that the correct appellate body 
address the issue and issue a final decision. [R. at 139, f 20.] 
24. After Harrington received the letter he telephoned Foxes' counsel, wherein 
it was discussed having the appeal heard by the Planning Commission. Harrington 
informed the Foxes' counsel that the hearing would be scheduled upon the receipt of a 
$100 appeal fee. [R. at 139, If 21.] 
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25. On April 25, 2006, Foxes' counsel mailed the $100 appeal fee to the 
Department along with a cover letter. Pursuant to the Department's instructions, the 
$100 appeal fee was paid, accepted, and a hearing scheduled on the Planning 
Commission Appeal. [R. at 140, ^  22.] 
26. On May 11, 2006, Park City deposited the Foxes' appeal fee as evidenced 
by a dated receipt received from Park City outlining the same. [R. at 140, <|[ 23.] 
27. On June 14, 2006, the Planning Commission held the hearing on the 
Planning Commission Appeal. In its written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, dated June 16, 2006 (the "Planning Commission Order"), the Planning 
Commission found that the issuance of a building permit was a "Final Action" which 
must be appealed within ten days of its issuance, despite the fact that absolutely no notice 
of such permit was provided. The Planning Commission also found that the appeal was 
not complete until May 11, 2006, the date the Department deposited the $100 appeal 
check delivered to it the preceding month. Accordingly, the Planning Commission 
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was not timely filed. [R. at 140, ^ 
24.] 
28. On June 26, 2006, the Foxes timely filed an appeal of the Planning 
Commission Order to the Board of Adjustment and paid the required appeal fee. [R. at 7, 
f46; 140,H25.] 
29. On August 22, 2006, the Board of Adjustment held a hearing on this 
appeal. [R. at 8, If 47.] 
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30. In its written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, dated 
August 24, 2006 (the "Board of Adjustment Order"), the Board of Adjustment dismissed 
the Foxes' appeal, claiming that the Board of Adjustment lacked jurisdiction due to the 
Foxes' alleged failure to timely file their appeal. [R. at 141, f 27.] 
31. The Foxes timely filed their Petition in the Third Judicial District Court on 
September 22, 2006. [R. at 1-12.] 
32. After oral arguments, on June 6, 2007, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck of the 
Third Judicial District granted Park City's motion to dismiss, granted Legacy 
Development's motion for summary judgment and denied the Foxes' motion for 
summary judgment. [R. at 208-226.] 
33. In his Ruling and Order, Judge Lubeck ruled that the initial staff decision to 
issue a building permit, without notice, constituted a "Final Action" under the LMC 
which became final and non appealable if not appealed within ten days.. Thus, not 
having filed an appeal within ten days from this staff decision, even though the Foxes did 
not know of this decision, rendered their appeal untimely. [R. at 208-226.] 
34. On July 6,2007, the Foxes timely filed their "Notice of Appeal" in this 
matter. [R. at 236-238.] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In the proceedings below, the District Court erred in determining that the 
Department's issuance of a building permit to Legacy Development constituted a "Final 
Action" for purposes of appeal LMC § 15-1-18(E) provides that "[a]ppeals must be 
made within ten (10) calendar days of the Final Action." The LMC defines a "Final 
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Action" as the "final vote or written decision on a matter." LMC § 15-15-1.90. 
Accordingly, "Final Action occurs when the deciding body has adopted and executed 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law." LMC § 15-1-18(N). 
The issuance of the building permit was not a "Final Action" for purposes of 
appeal for several reasons. First, the LMC makes it clear that a "Final Action" requiring 
an appeal within ten days is a written decision issued by one of Park City's Boards or 
Commissions. Day to day decisions of staff members, for which no notice is provided to 
interested parties, are not "Final Actions." Second, a building permit that is issued 
contrary to applicable zoning requirements, such as building heights, cannot be a "Final 
Action." Third, "Final Actions" are typically those that are made following notice. In 
this case, the building permit was issued without notice. Due process requires that 
property owners not lose their rights without some form of notice. 
In addition, the Foxes timely filed their appeal to the Planning Commission based 
on the facts of this case. Because Legacy Development chose to forego the undertaking 
of a proper variance application with the Board of Adjustment and to provide proper 
notice to adjacent property owners, the Foxes had no actual or constructive knowledge of 
any actual issue regarding the three buildings' heights until January 2006. Once the 
Foxes learned of Legacy Development's violations of the applicable LMC height 
restrictions, they timely filed their appeal with the Planning Commission within 10 days 
of their discovery on January 19, 2006. 
Because the Foxes timely filed their appeal, the Board of Adjustment's ruling that 
the body lacked jurisdiction to decide the Foxes' appeal on the merits was arbitrary, 
11 
capricious, and illegal. Consequently, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision 
and remand this case back to the Board of Adjustment for a full and fair adjudication of 
the Foxes' claims based on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
THAT THE STAFF DECISION TO ISSUE A BUILDING PERMIT 
CONSTITUTED A "FINAL ACTION," WHICH WOULD TRIGGER THE 
TEN-DAY PERIOD BY WHICH THE FOXES COULD TIMELY APPEAL. 
The District Court erred in upholding the Board of Adjustment's dismissal of the 
Foxes' appeal based on a legal determination that the Building Permit was a "Final 
Action" under the LMC. LMC § 15-1-18 governs appeals of "Final Actions." Pursuant 
to LMC § 15-1-18(E),"[a]ppeals must be made within ten (10) calendar days of the Final 
Action." The LMC defines a "Final Action" as "the final vote or written decision on a 
matter." LMC § 15-15-1.90. Accordingly, in the context of an appeal, LMC § 15-1-
18(N) provides that a "Final Action occurs when the deciding body has adopted and 
executed written findings of fact and conclusions of law." Based on these definitions, 
the staff decision to issue a building permit to Legacy Development was not a "Fipal 
Action" subject to the ten day appeal period. 
A. The Issuance of the Building Permit is Not a "Final Action," 
The LMC makes it clear that a "Final Action" requiring an appeal within ten days 
is a written decision issued by one of the City's Boards or Commissions. Such written 
decisions, however, are contrasted with mere day-to-day decisions of staff members 
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which do not constitute Final Actions. Section 15-1-18 of the LMC outlines the various 
decisions and respective appeal rights: 
(A) STAFF. Any decision by the Planning Director regarding Application 
of this LMC to a Property may be appealed to the Planning Commission. 
Decisions regarding compliance with the Historic District Guidelines may 
be appealed to the Historic Preservation Board. The Appeal must be filed 
with the Planning Department. There shall be no additional notice for 
Appeal of the staff determination other than listing the matter on the 
agenda, unless notice of the staff review was provided in which case the 
same notice must be given for the Appeal. 
(B) HISTORIC PRESERVATION BOARD (HPB). Final Actions by 
the Historic Preservation Board may be appealed to the Board of 
Adjustment. 
(O PLANNING COMMISSION. Final Actions by the Planning 
Commission on staff Appeals may be appealed to the Board of Adjustment. 
Final Action by the Planning Commission on Conditional Use Permits and 
MPDs may be appealed to the City Council. Only those decisions in which 
the Planning Commission has applied a land Use ordinance to a particular 
Application, Person, or Parcel may be appealed to an appeal authority. 
(Emphasis added). Actions by the Historic Preservation Board and the Planning 
Commission are characterized as "Final Actions." Actions by Staff, however, are not 
referred to as "Final Actions" but mere "decisions." In fact, the term "Final Action" is 
nowhere to be found in the entire paragraph describing Staff decisions. 
This conclusion is supported by the LMC's own definition of a "Final Action." 
Under the LMC, a "Final Action" is "the final vote or written decision on a matter." 
LMC § 15-15-1.90. A vote envisions the deliberate effort of a multi-person board or 
commission. See, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (a "vote" is the "expression of 
one's preference or opinion in a meeting...."). Similarly, a written decision envisions a 
determination of a deliberative body after consideration of an issue. See, Black's Law 
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Dictionary (8 ed. 2004 ) (a "decision" is a "judicial or agency determination after 
consideration of the facts and the law"). Accordingly, LMC § 15-1-18(N) provides that a 
"Final Action occurs when the deciding body has adopted and executed written findings 
of fact and conclusions of law." (Emphasis added). Nowhere in the LMC is the single 
act of a staff member described as a "Final Action," "vote," "written decision" or act by a 
"deciding body" - nor could it be. 
In the present case, the building permit was issued in a day-to-day decision of a 
staff Department member. In issuing this permit, that staff member did not vote or issue 
a written decision or written findings of fact and conclusions of law. In issuing the 
permit, the staff member did nothing which would fall within the definition of a Final 
Action under the LMC. Thus, the issuance of a building permit does not constitute a 
Final Action. 
In its Ruling, the District Court noted the difference between staff decisions and 
final actions taken by agencies or commissions, but only considered this effect as to the 
requirement of notice: 
Plaintiffs' argument ignores the LMC's requirements for notice and its 
distinctions between finality requirements at different levels of decision-
making. Written findings of fact and conclusions of law are only required 
if a final action is taken at the appellate or reconsideration level. In 
contrast, an initial staff decision (to issue or not issue a building permit) is 
final when the latter of a vote or a written decision is issued on a matter. 
[R. at 220.] The Foxes did understand and argue the differences between these different 
decision making levels. But, the importance of this distinction in this case is not the 
impact on notice, but what decisions are "Final Actions" to which a 10 day period 
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applies. Although the District Court noted the differences for purposes of notice, it failed 
to note the difference as it affects what is a Final Action. Only Final Actions made at the 
appellate or reconsideration levels are Final Actions to which the ten day period applies. 
The conclusion that a staff decision to issue a building permit is not a Final Action 
makes sense. Absent circumstances justifying a claim of estoppel against the 
municipality, the mere issuance of a building permit does not create vested rights. See, 
e.g., City ofBoynton Beach v. Carroll, 272 So.2d 171 (Fla. App. 1973). Similarly, the 
vast majority of case law holds that an improperly issued building permit vests no rights 
or privileges in the person to whom the permit was issued. See, e.g., Grasso v. Borough 
of Spring Lake Heights, 375 N.J. Super. 41, 866 A.2d 988 (App. Div. 2004) (building 
permit issued contrary to zoning ordnance or code does not provide any rights). A staff 
decision to issue or not issue a building permit must be contrasted with the rights 
established following a final appellate decision made after a public hearing with notice. 
For example, if a developer challenges a refusal to issue a building permit by following 
the administrative appeal process mandated by the municipality, both the developer and 
the builder are bound by the final decision of the appellate body. See, e.g., WCHS, Inc. v. 
City ofLynnwood, 2004 WL 370760 (Wash. App. 2004). 
1
 The District Court explained the difference in notice requirements for staff versus 
reconsideration decisions as due to "a policy that favors the builder over neighbors" — 
"one this court [does not have] the power to change." [R. at 221.] The LMC contains no 
such policy - at least expressly. Rather the difference in notice requirements is due to the 
fact that staff decisions, for which no notice be given, are not Final Actions which require 
interested parties to appeal within 10 days. 
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Furthermore, a building permit issued in violation of the LMC cannot be 
considered a "Final Action." Consistent with case law holding that an improperly issued 
building permit grants no rights, the LMC provides that a valid building permit can only 
be issued if the proposed structure meets certain criteria, including building height. See 
LMC § 15-1-9(A)(2) (application for a building permit must comply "with all applicable 
Development requirements of that zone, including Building Height, Set back, Front, Side, 
and Rear Yards and Lot coverage") (emphasis added). If a building permit is issued for a 
structure that does not comply with the LMC, specifically including the height 
limitations, that permit simply is not valid. LMC § 15-1-9(D) clearly provides that "[n]° 
permit issued shall be valid if any of the criteria listed in this section has not been met." 
Clearly, an invalid permit cannot be final and non-appealable. 
In its Ruling, the District Court cited both the LMC and Western Land Equities v. 
Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980) for the proposition that building permits, once issued, 
are final. [R. at 219.] Both the LMC and Western Land, however, clearly provide that 
only holders of permits that conform to applicable land use ordinances can rely on such 
permits. In Western Land, the Court held that "an applicant is entitled to a building 
permit or subdivision approval if his proposed development meets the zoning 
requirements in existence at the time of his application and if he proceeds with reasonable 
diligence, absent a compelling, countervailing public interest." 617 P.2d at 396. 
Similarly, the LMC specifically conditions the right of reliance on a land use permit to 
the situation where "the Application conforms to the requirements of an applicable land 
Use ordinance in effect." LMC §15-1-17. Whether the Legacy Development permit 
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complied with applicable land use requirements is the principal issue in this dispute. 
Therefore, neither Western Land nor the LMC are determinative in this case where the 
underlying challenge is to a building permit that did not comply "to the requirements of 
applicable land use ordinances." 
B. There Can Be No Final Action On A Building Permit That Requires A 
Variance Without Notice To Interested Parties, 
Final Actions are typically those that are rendered after notice and a hearing. 
Since the staffs issuance of the building permit does not fall within this category, it is not 
a Final Action. In this case, Legacy Development failed to provide any notice 
whatsoever in obtaining a permit that exceeded the applicable height requirements for the 
three buildings. 
Whether Legacy Development should have been excused from the height 
requirement was a question of variance. Only the Board of Adjustment can hear and 
grant variances. See LMC § 15-1-8(1) ("Variances, Non-Conforming Uses, and Non-
Complying Structures are reviewed by the Board of Adjustment"). The consideration of 
a variance application requires public notice. See \MC § 15-1-12 (outlining procedures 
for providing notice of public hearings before the Board of Adjustment). Notice of a 
pending public hearing on an application for a variance should be given in three separate 
ways under the LMC: (1) by notice posted on the property and on Park City's official 
website, or in at least three public places within the municipality; (2) by publishing notice 
in a newspaper having a general circulation within Park City; and (3) by mailing notice to 
property owners within 300 feet of the subject property. See generally, LMC § 15-1-
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12(A-C). The process of applying for a variance and providing notice of a public hearing 
on the variance application was mandatory and had to be followed prior to the issuance of 
a building permit which contained such a variance. See LMC § 15-1-11(B) ("[A]pproval 
must be obtained from the Board of Adjustment prior to the issuance of any Conditional 
Use permit or Master Plan Development, or other approval by the Planning Commission 
or Planning Department. All action on an application shall be stayed upon the 
determination that a Board of Adjustment approval is required."). 
Although Legacy Development knew that the various heights of its proposed 
structures raised a serious issue, it decided not to seek a variance or otherwise provide 
notice to affected parties. No notices were posted on the Subject Property, on the city's 
website, or in at least three public places within the city. No notice was published in a 
newspaper circulated within the city. In addition, Legacy Development did not provide 
stamped, pre-addressed envelopes for each owner of record within 300 feet and notice to 
such parties was never made. 
Relying on the courtesy language of section 15-1-12, the District Court interpreted 
the notice requirement as strictly one of courtesy, rather than a legal requirement. See R. 
at 215. LMC § 15-1-12(C) provides that "[c]ourtesy notice is not a legal requirement, 
and any defect in courtesy notice shall not affect or invalidate any hearing or action by 
the City Council or any Board or Commission." This provision, however, does not 
validate actions taken on no notice. Instead, it simply provides that after the applicant 
provides the mandatory owner addresses and envelopes, if one or more were in error, 
notice is not invalidated. In that case, notice was is still provided to the erroneously 
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addressed property owner by posting, website and publishing. The District Court's 
reliance on this provision ignores the fact that even if a property owner notice is 
misaddressed, posting and publishing are still required. In no event does LMC §15-1-12 
provide that no notice is acceptable. 
In sum, as no variance hearing was held or any notice provided of such a proposed 
variance, the issuance of the building permit cannot be considered a "Final Action" on 
the issue of whether Legacy Development's three buildings complied with the LMC 
height restrictions. 
C. Due Process Mandates the Conclusion That Issuance of the Building 
Permit Was Not a "Final Action." 
The notion that a no notice building permit can violate the LMC and be issued 
contrary to the variance and notice requirements of the LMC, but cannot be challenged 
unless adjoining property owners somehow catch the error on their own within ten days, 
runs counter to fundamental notions of due process recognized under Utah law. Under 
Utah's Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act ("UMLCDA"), "[e]ach 
appeal authority shall respect the due proces^ s rights of each of the participants." Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9a-706(2) (2005). Hence, Utah law recognizes that due process is a 
fundamental requirement imposed in every land management code of every Utah 
municipality. Furthermore, Utah case law recognizes that lack of proper notice in land 
use decisions destroys fundamental notions of procedural due process. See, e.g., Tolman 
v. Salt Lake County, 437 P.2d 442, 447-48 (Utah 1968) (holding due process rights 
infringed through failure to properly post adequate notice of proposed zoning variance). 
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Based on Utah's strong recognition of due process rights, if a proposed building 
permit raises issues that impact the rights of adjoining property owners, such as view 
corridors, that could be impacted by obstructing building heights, due process requires 
notice prior to the elimination of these rights. Accordingly, the LMC variance 
procedures provide the mandatory due process notice. Unfortunately, Legacy 
Development decided not to provide the required notice and the consequences should be 
borne by it. To hold otherwise would lead to bad public policy. 
Rather than try to obtain variances with notice to adjoining landowners who might 
be motivated to object and protect their property rights, developers would be encouraged 
to first try to end-run the variance and notice requirements by obtaining a no-notice 
variance and building permit. If successful in obtaining the permit without notice, 
developers never have to comply with the variance and notice requirements of the LMC. 
If caught within ten days, developers can address the variance issue at that time. 
However, no down-side exists in first attempting to end-run the notice and variance 
process. Obviously, lack of notice eliminates the possibility of objections and makes the 
process simpler. Without notice, interested parties will never find out about the issue 
within ten days of issuance of the permit. For issues such as building heights, nothing 
will be done within ten days to alert interested parties. In most cases, little if anything is 
done on the property within the initial ten day period. In addition, knowledge of the 
issuance of a building permit alone would not be enough to notify interested parties of 
issues such as offending building heights. Parties could reasonably expect that issuance 
of a building permit did not raise variance issues that should only be considered after 
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public notice. Under the District Court's interpretation of the LMC, however, to protect 
their rights, all property owners must literally camp out at the Department and, if a 
building permit is issued within 300 feet of their property, immediately investigate to 
determine if all applicable land use ordinances were complied with. 
During the hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment and the motion to 
dismiss, the District Court recognized the potential for abuse resulting from a ruling that 
all building permits cannot be challenged after ten days of issuance: 
I mean, any builder that gets a permit could simply not do anything for ten 
days. Don't bring in the cranes. Don't bring in the back hoes. Don't put up 
the yellow tape. Then no neighbor could ever know that a permit [was 
issued]—unless they lived down at the.. .application center of Park City, 
where they're all filed. There would never be an appeal. 
R. at 248 (Hearing Transcript at p. 24). Although the District Court acknowledged that 
the argument that due process requires notice "has a certain surface appeal," the Court 
determined that the issuance of a building permit was a Final Action for which no notice 
was required to commence the ten day appeal period.2 [R. at 220.] Due process is more 
The District Court also explained its decision not to allow a challenge to the building 
permit through the City's appeal process by stating that the Foxes "are not completely 
without any remedy as a private action alleging a violation of zoning ordinances, or 
nuisance, or some other theory imaginable" may be pursued. [R. at 222.]. This 
statement, however, is in direct conflict with an earlier decision of this same court in 
another challenge to the height limitations of these very same structures. In Brett v. 
Legacy Development Group, LLC, Third Judicial District Court, Case no. 050500458 (a 
copy of the District Court's Ruling and Order is included in the Addendum to this brief), 
other property owners unrelated to the Foxes filed an action before this District Court 
asserting the very same private causes of action referenced by the District Court in the 
Ruling in this case. However, there, the District Court dismissed such causes of action, 
ruling that property owners were required to pursue the administrative appeal procedure 
through the LMC. It is difficult to reconcile these two decisions. 
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than a right with surface appeal. It is mandated by Utah law. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, THAT THE FOXES' APPEAL WAS UNTIMELY. 
The Foxes timely filed their appeal based on when they discovered the possibility 
that Legacy Development's three buildings might violate the height requirements. 
Absent some form of notice, the Foxes should not have been required to file their appeal 
prior to this date. 
A. The Foxes5 Appeal Was Timely Filed. 
As explained above, the issuance of the building permit was not a "Final Action," 
which would require the Foxes to file their appeal within ten days after the issuance of 
the building permit. Because Legacy Development chose not to provide the requisite 
notice, the Foxes did not have constructive or actual knowledge of the potential height 
problems until within ten days prior to the filing of their appeal. Once the Foxes noticed 
the apparent impending height violations of the buildings, Bret Fox went to the 
Department the very next day to review the plans for Legacy Development's buildings. 
[R. at 138.] After reviewing the building plans^ Bret Fox believed the buildings violated 
the LMC height restrictions and inquired of Park City as to how to assert this issue. Id, 
Based on the instructions provided by Park City, the Foxes filed their appeal within ten 
days of the first knowledge Bret Fox obtained as to the height problem. Id. Therefore, 
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the Foxes timely filed their initial appeal to the Planning Commission pursuant to LMC § 
15-1-18(E).3 
The timing of the Foxes' appeal to the Planning Commission does not circumvent 
the ten day requirement imposed by LMC § 15-1-18(E), as Legacy Development asserted 
to the trial court. Utah law imposes strict penalties for those who do not aggressively 
pursue their rights under the common law doctrine of laches. "The doctrine of laches is 
'based upon [the] maxim that equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their 
rights."5 CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State, 2001 UT 37, \ 14, 24 P.3d 966, 970. See also 
Collard v. Nagle Constr. Co,, 2002 UT App 306, If 28, 57 P.3d 603, 610 ("Laches bars a 
recovery when there has been a delay by one party causing a disadvantage to the other 
party."). In the instant case, the Foxes did not sit on their claims and let weeks, or even 
months, go by until they pursued their claims. Rather, they quickly and diligently filed 
This case is not the only case involving the height restriction of these three structures. 
In Brett v. Legacy Development Group, LLC, Case No. 050500458, another neighbor 
challenged the height restriction before the same trial court, which ruled against the 
Foxes in this case. There, the District Court held that an appeal was timely if filed within 
10 days of actual notice of an LMC violation by a developer. As Judge Lubeck held in 
his December 14, 2005 Ruling and Order in Brett: 
While plaintiffs argument about an inability to meet an appeal deadline 
within the PC LMC (here, 10 days) may have some merit in a given case, 
here there has been no administrative appeal filed by plaintiffs, timely or 
not. After a date certain, whether that was August 5 or 8, 2005, plaintiffs 
had actual notice of the anticipated height of the buildings defendant was 
constructing. Had plaintiffs sought an appeal of the Community 
Development Department, their argument that they had appealed as soon 
as they had notice would no doubt have great merit, at least to this court. 
Here, that did not occur, but rather plaintiffs sought judicial review. 
(Ruling and Order, dated December 14, 2005, at 8 (emphasis added)). 
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their appeal within ten days of noticing and believing that Legacy Development's 
buildings may violate the LMC height requirements. Of course, if Legacy Development 
wanted finality it could simply have followed the variance and notice procedures. The 
fact that Legacy Development did not choose to undergo the variance process, whereby 
the Foxes would have had the opportunity to be informed of the height issue, should not 
serve to disadvantage the Foxes in pursuing their claims. The Foxes respectfully submit 
that the consequences of a failure to provide notice should be borne by the party who 
chose not to give notice - here, Legacy Development. In sum, the Foxes appeal was 
timely and complied with the spirit of LMC § 15-1-18(E). 
B. The Timing of the Payment of the Required Filing Fee is Not a 
Jurisdictional Bar to the Foxes' Claims, 
Although the District Court held that the Foxes appeal was untimely because it 
was not filed within ten days of the issuance of the building permit, the District Court 
also suggested that the Foxes' failure to submit the $100 appeal fee at the time of their 
initial appeal rendered the appeal defective. The District Court so ruled even in light of 
the undisputed fact that Mr. Fox specially asked the City what he needed to do to appeal 
and the City made no mention of an appeal fee and accepted the appeal without payment 
of a fee. [R. at 138-139.] 
In addition to providing detail as to the content of the letter for appeal, the LMC 
states that an applicant shall "pay the applicable fee established by resolution." LMC § 
15-1-18(F). No amount was specified within the LMC. No amount was provided in the 
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Park City website.4 How the fee is determined was not specified - whether a fixed fee, 
sliding fee, a fee dependant on type of appeal, entity appealed to, costs of notice, etc. 
Most importantly, no time period was specified as to when the fee should be paid. All of 
this information was solely within the knowledge of Park City. 
It is undisputed that prior to the time the Foxes filed their appeal, Bret Fox 
specifically asked Park City what he needed to do to perfect an appeal. Park City 
outlined the letter requirements, but did not mention a fee. It is also undisputed that the 
first mention of a fee came during the discussions whereby Foxes' counsel was 
attempting to obtaining a hearing or decision from the Planning Commission. At this 
time, Park City clearly represented that payment of the fee would result in a hearing. 
Park City did not say that it was too late to pay the fee. Instead, Park City asked for, 
received, and accepted the fee. 
Utah case law is clear that payment of a filing fee in an appeal is not jurisdictional. 
Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, \ 13, 17 P.3d 1110 (Utah 2000); Shearer v. Labor 
Commission, 2001 WL 1476577 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). The District Court distinguished 
these two cases on the grounds that the Utah appellate rules prohibit the clerk from 
accepting an appeal without a filing fee wherein the LMC did not. Although the Foxes 
acknowledge this distinction, the Foxes respectfully assert that this distinction mandates a 
contrary result. The requirement that the clerk not accept an appeal without the fee sets 
4
 On or about June 7, 2007, one day after the Third District Court denied the Foxes' 
motion for summary judgment, Park City began posting a fee schedule on the city's main 
website, which lists the required $100 appeal fee. 
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forth a much stronger bar than the mere mention of a potential fee associated with an 
appeal in an undisclosed amount. 
In any event, Park City should be estopped from now arguing that its acceptance 
of the fee after the filing of the appeal renders the appeal defective. How much and 
whether a particular fee was charged for this particular appeal was exclusively within the 
knowledge of Park City. Bret Fox asked and Park City didn't mention or require a fee. 
Park City should not be able to deny its own actions. When Park City asked for either a 
fee or a waiver request as a condition to scheduling the appeal hearing, the fee was paid 
and accepted by Park City. 
After instructing the Foxes on how to file an appeal without mentioning an appeal 
fee, accepting the appeal, then later accepting the appeal filing fee, Park City cannot now 
assert a jurisdictional bar. Under well-established law, payment of the filing fee was not 
jurisdictional, and the timing of the payment did not bar either the Planning Commission 
or the Board of Adjustment from reaching a decision on the Foxes' appeal based on the 
merits. 
III. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT'S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS, AND ILLEGAL IN NOT DECIDING THE FOXES' 
APPEAL ON THE MERITS. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(2)(a), any party adversely affected by a 
final land use decision may file a petition for review of the decision with the District 
Court within 30 days after the local land use decision is final. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-
801(2)(a) (2005). Once a petition is filed, the court shall "determine only whether or not 
the decision, ordinance or regulation is arbitrary, capricious or illegal." Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 10-9a~801(3)(a)(ii). "A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is 
valid if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(c). "A determination of illegality 
requires a determination that the decision...violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect 
at the time the decision was made...." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(d). 
In the present case, the Board of Adjustment's ruling exemplified a decision that 
was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal and in violation of Utah law. Rather than granting 
the Foxes' a hearing on the merits, the Board of Adjustment ruled that staffs issuance of 
a building permit, without notice, prohibited any challenge after ten days. As outlined 
above, that decision is contrary to the LMC and applicable law. It is, therefore, illegal. 
Consequently, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision and remand this case for 
further proceedings by the Board of Adjustment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Department's issuance of the Building Permit to Legacy Development for the 
construction of three buildings which violated the LMC height restrictions, was not a 
"Final Action" for purposes of appeal. Furthermore, the Foxes timely filed their appeal 
once they learned that Legacy Development's three buildings potentially would violate 
the height restrictions. All the Foxes want is a full and fair hearing on their concerns 
regarding the height violations of the Subject Property. That opportunity has been denied 
to the Foxes at every level at Park City. Due process mandates that the Foxes' appeal be 
heard. Accordingly, the Foxes respectively request that this Court reverse the District 
Court's decision and require the Board of Adjustment to hold a full and fair hearing on 
the Foxes' appeal 
ADDENDUM 
Attached hereto as an addendum are: (1) determinative provisions from the Park 
City Land Management Code and the Utah Code; (2) the trial court's June 6, 2007 Ruling 
and Order; and (3) the Ruling and Order, dated December 14, 2005, in Brett v. Legacy 
Development Group, LLC, Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 050500458. 
DATED this 17th day of October, 2007. 
MILLER GUYMON, P*C. 
Blake D. Toiler 
Ryan K. Done 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
Provisions from the Park City Land Management Code ("LMC") 
15-1-18. APPEALS AND RECONSIDERATION PROCESS. 
(A) STAFF. Any decision by the Planning Director regarding Application of this LMC 
to a Property may be appealed to the Planning Commission. Decisions regarding 
compliance with the Historic District Guidelines may be appealed to the Historic 
Preservation Board. The Appeal must be filed with the Planning Department. There 
shall be no additional notice for Appeal of the staff determination other than listing the 
matter on the agenda, unless notice of the staff review was provided in which case the 
same notice must be given for the Appeal. 
(B) HISTORIC PRESERVATION BOARD (HPB). Final Actions by the Historic 
Preservation Board may be appealed to the Board of Adjustment. 
(C) PLANNING COMMISSION. Final Actions by the Planning Commission on staff 
Appeals may be appealed to the Board of Adjustment. Final Action by the Planning 
Commission on Conditional Use Permits and MPDs may be appealed to the City 
Council. Only those decisions in which the Planning Commission has applied a land Use 
ordinance to a particular Application, Person, or Parcel may be appealed to an appeal 
authority. 
(D) STANDING TO APPEAL. The following has standing to appeal a Final Action: 
(1) Any Person who submitted written comment or testified on a proposal before the 
Planning Department, Historic Preservation Board or Planning Commission; 
(2) The Owner of any Property within three hupdred feet (300f) of the boundary of the 
subject Site; 
(3) Any City official, Board or Commission having jurisdiction over the matter; and 
(4) The Owner of the subject Property. 
(E) TIMING. All Appeals must be made within ten (10) calendar days of the Final 
Action. The reviewing body, with the consultation of the appellant, shall set a date for the 
Appeal. 
(F) FORM OF APPEALS. Appeals to the Planning Commission or Board of Adjustment 
must be filed with the Planning Department. Appeals to the City Council must be filed 
with the City Recorder. Appeals must be by letter or petition, and must contain the name, 
address, and telephone number of the petitioner; his or her relationship to the project or 
subject Property; and must have a comprehensive statement of all the reasons for the 
Appeal, including specific provisions of the law, if known, that are alleged to be violated 
by the action taken. The Applicant shall pay the applicable fee established by resolution. 
The adversely affected party shall present to the appeal authority every theory of relief 
that it can raise in district court. 
(G) BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW. The appeal authority shall 
act in a quasi-judicial manner. The appellant has the burden of proving that the land Use 
authority erred. Except for appeals to the Board of Adjustment, the appeal authority shall 
review factual matters de novo and it shall determine the correctness of a decision of the 
land Use authority in its interpretation and Application of a land Use ordinance. 
(H) WRITTEN FINDINGS REQUIRED. The Appellate Body shall direct Staff to 
prepare detailed written: 
(1) Findings of Fact which explain and support the Staff decision; 
(2) Conclusions as to how a contrary decision would violate the provisions of this LMC, 
other City ordinances, or applicable state or federal laws or regulations. 
(I) CITY COUNCIL ACTION ON APPEALS. 
(1) The City Council, with the consultation of the Appellant, shall set a date for the 
Appeal. 
(2) The City Recorder shall notify the Owner of the Appeal date. The City Recorder shall 
obtain the findings, conclusions and all other pertinent information from the Planning 
Department and shall transmit them to the Council. 
(3) The City Council may affirm, reverse, or affirm in part and reverse in part any 
properly appealed decision of the Planning Commission. The City Council may remand 
the matter to the appropriate body with directions for specific Areas of review or 
clarification. City Council review of petitions of Appeal shall be limited to consideration 
of only those matters raised by the petition(s), unless the Council by motion, enlarges the 
scope of the Appeal to accept information on other matters. 
(4) Staff must prepare written findings within fifteen (15) working days of the City 
Council vote on the matter. 
(J) CITY COUNCIL CALL-UP. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of Final Action on 
any project, the City Council, on its own motion, may call any Final Action taken by the 
Planning Commission or Planning Director up for review by the Council. The call-up 
shall require the majority vote of the Council. Notice of the call-up shall be given to the 
Chairman of the Planning Commission and/or Planning Director by the Recorder, 
together with the date set by the Council for consideration of the merits of the matter. The 
Recorder shall also provide notice as required by Section 15-1 -12 herein. In calling a 
matter up, the Council may limit the scope of the call-up hearing to certain issues, and 
need not take public input at the hearing. The City Council, with the consultation of the 
Applicant, shall set a date for the call-up. The City Recorder shall notify the Applicant of 
the call-up date. The City Recorder shall obtain the findings, and all other pertinent 
information and transmit them to the Council. 
(K) NOTICE. Notice of all Appeals to City Council or call-ups shall be given by: 
(1) Publishing the matter once at least seven (7) days prior to the hearing in a newspaper 
having general circulation in Park City; and 
(2) By mailing courtesy notice seven (7) days prior to the hearing to all parties who 
received mailed courtesy notice for the original action. 
(L) STAY OF APPROVAL PENDING REVIEW OF APPEAL. Upon the filing of an 
Appeal, any approval granted by the Historic District Commission or the Planning 
Commission will be suspended until the City Council has acted on the Appeal. 
(M) APPEAL FROM THE CITY COUNCIL. The Applicant or any Person aggrieved by 
City action on the project may Appeal from the Final Action by the City Council 
affecting the project to a court of competent jurisdiction. The decision of the Council 
stands, and those affected by the decision may act in reliance on it unless and until the 
court enters an interlocutory or final order modifying the decision. 
(N) FINALITY OF ACTION. Final Action occurs when the deciding body has adopted 
and executed written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(O) RECONSIDERATION. The City Council, and any Board or Commission, may 
reconsider at any time any legislative decision upon an affirmative vote of a majority of 
that body. The City Council, and any Board or Commission, may reconsider any quasi-
judicial decision upon an affirmative vote of a majority of that body at any time prior to 
Final Action. Any action taken by the deciding body shall not be reconsidered or 
rescinded at a special meeting unless the number of members of the deciding body 
present at the special meeting is equal to or greater than the number of members present 
at the meeting when the action was approved. 
(P) No participating member of the appeal panel may entertain an appeal in which he or 
she acted as the land Use authority. 
15-1 -12. NOTICE. 
Notice of a public hearing before the City Council, Planning Commission, Board of 
Adjustment, and Historic District Commission must be provided in accordance with this 
section. All notices, unless otherwise specified in this Code or State law, must describe 
the proposed action affecting the subject Property or modification to the Park City 
General Plan, and the time, place and date set for public hearing on the matter. Notice 
shall be given according to 15-1-20 Notice Matrix and as follows: 
(A) POSTED NOTICES. The Community Development Department must post notice on 
the Property affected by the Application and on the City's official website or in at least 
three (3) public locations within the municipality. 
(B) PUBLISHED NOTICE. Published notice shall be given by publication in a 
newspaper having general circulation in Park City. 
(C) COURTESY NOTICE. As a courtesy to adjacent Property Owners, the Applicant 
must provide the Planning Department with stamped and pre-addressed envelopes for 
each Owner of record of each Parcel located entirely or partly within three hundred feet 
(300f) from all Property Lines of the subject Property, together with a mailing list for 
those Owners. The addresses for adjacent Owners must be as shown on the most recently 
available Summit County tax assessment rolls. If the subject Property is a Condominium, 
the Owners Association is sufficient in lieu of the address for each unit Owner. Courtesy 
notice is not a legal requirement, and any defect in courtesy notice shall not affect or 
invalidate any hearing or action by the City Council or any Board or Commission. 
(D) APPLICANT NOTICE. For each land Use Application, the Planning Department 
must notify the Applicant of the date, time and place of each public hearing and public 
meeting to consider the Application and of any Final Action on a pending Application. 
(E) EFFECT OF NOTICE. Proof that notice was given pursuant to subsections (A) and 
(B), above is prima facie evidence that notice was properly given. If notice given under 
authority of this section is not challenged as provided for under State law within thirty 
(30) days after the date of the hearing for which the challenged notice was given, the 
notice is considered adequate and proper. 
(¥) OWNERS ASSOCIATION REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION. 
(1) REGISTRATION. Owners associations desiring notice of requests for Building 
Permits within their boundaries must file written registration annually with the Park City 
Building Department and pay an annual fee of fifty dollars ($50.00). The registration 
must consist of a copy of the Owners association's Utah State business or corporate 
registration and the name(s), addresses including post office box numbers, and telephone 
numbers of at least three (3) authorized representatives of the Owners association and a 
notarized statement certifying that these individuals are the authorized representatives of 
said association. 
Associations not registered with the City will not be included in the published list of 
Owners associations and do not receive notice of Building Permit requests prior to their 
issuance. 
Any change(s) in the above information must be forwarded in writing to the Building 
Department within ten (10) days of the change. 
(2) NOTICE. Prior to, or at the time of, Application for a permit for any Development, 
the Applicant must file with the City evidence of notification to the appropriate registered 
Owners association(s). Acceptable evidence of notification shall be the following: 
(a) the properly executed notice form, as approved by the City; or 
(b) a signed return receipt from a certified letter posted to the registered association 
representative, with a copy of the notice form approved by the City. 
(3) CITY NOT PARTY TO DISPUTES. The City is not the arbiter of disputes between 
an Applicant and an Owners association. Nothing herein shall be interpreted to require 
Owners association consent prior to City Final Action. 
15-15-1.90. FINAL ACTION. The later of the final vote or written decision on a 
matter. 
Provisions from Utah Code Annotated 
Utah Code Ann. 8 10-9a-706 (2005): 
(1) Each appeal authority shall conduct each appeal and variance request as 
provided in local ordinance. 
(2) Each appeal authority shall respect the due process rights of each of the 
participants. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRET FOX and TAWNYA FOX, 
Plaintiffs, 
V, 
PARK CITY; PARK CITY BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT; and LEGACY 
DEVELOPMENT GROUP, 
Defendants-
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 060500476 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: June 6, 2007 
The above matter came before the court for oral argument on 
June 4, 2007, on plaintiffs' Petition for Review of Board of 
Adjustment Order, motion for summary judgment, and Legacy's 
motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs were present through Blake D. Miller, Park City 
was present through Polly Samuels McLean and Legacy was present 
through Eric P. Lee. 
The petition was filed September 22, 2006. Park City 
Municipal Corporation's and Park City Board of Adjustment's 
(collectively ^Park City")- filed their Motion to Dismiss February 
6, 2007. Legacy Development Group's ('"Legacy") filed a motion for 
summary judgment on February 15, 2007. Plaintiffs also filed a 
motion for summary judgment and opposition to defendants' motions 
on February 21, 2007. Park City filed a reply February 27, 2007, 
and Legacy filed a reply February 28, 2007. 
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since 
taking the issues under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. Now being 
fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
On May 6, 2005, Legacy applied to the Park City Community 
Development Department (the NADepartment") for a building permit 
to construct three buildings on property within 300 feet of a 
home owned by plaintiffs. On July 14, 2005, the Department 
granted Legacy's building permit for the three buildings and 
construction began shortly thereafter. Plaintiffs sent a notice 
of appeal to the £ark City Planning Commission on January 19, 
2006, when they claimed they discovered Legacy's units exceeded 
height restrictions of the Park City Municipal Corporations Land 
Management Code C'LMC"). Plaintiffs allege the excess height 
adversely affects the value of their property by interfering with 
the view from their property. They acknowledged the LMC requires 
appeals to be filed within ten calendar days of a final vote or 
written decision, but claim because they received no notice of a 
final decision on a variance from the LMC height requirements, 
the appeal was appropriate and timely upon discovery of the 
alleged violation. Plaintiffs did not include the required filing 
fee with their notice of appeal, claiming they were not told of 
the fee but later submitted $100 in April 2006. 
In a June 14, 2006, meeting, • the Planning Commission denied 
plaintiffsr appeal. In its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law the Commission explained its decision was based on the 
untimeliness of plaintiffs' appeal. Plaintiffs then appealed the 
Commission's denial to the Board of Adjustment, and the Board 
also denied the appeal on the same basis of untimeliness of the 
appeal. The basis for both denials was the determination that the 
issuance of a building permit constitutes a final action under 
LMC § 15-1-18. Thus,- appeals of final actions must be brought 
within ten days. Legacy's building permit was issued on July 14, 
2*005, and plaintiffs' filed their notice of appeal January 19, 
2006 and the filing fee some months thereafter. Plaintiffs' 
appeal was thus untimely, and neither the Planning Commission nor 
Board of Adjustment had jurisdiction.to consider the appeal. 
Plaintiffs appealed the Board's denial in their petition to this 
Court. Park City answered the petition, then filed a motion to 
dismiss. Legacy answered, then moved the Court for summary 
judgment. Plaintiffs responded to both motions and moved the 
court for summary judgment in their favor. 
ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs petition this Court for relief, alleging three 
causes of action relating to the building permit Legacy secured 
for construction in plaintiffs7 neighborhood. Plaintiffs assert 
Park City made errors in considering and approving Legacy's 
permitr and in dismissing the appeals. Plaintiffs claim they did 
not receive proper notice of Legacy7 s original application for 
Legacy's building permit nor the Department's approval and 
issuance of the permit. They argue a final decision requires 
notice and a hearing, thus the building permit is not a final 
decision. Rather, plaintiffs' discovery of the height-restriction 
violation is a final decision, thus plaintiffs7 appeal was 
timely. In the alternative the lack of a filing fee was not a 
jurisdictional bar to the previous appeals- Further, because the 
building permit mis-categorized Legacy's buildings as a triplex, 
when they are only joined by one underground wall between two of 
the buildings, the permit was illegal. Legacy's buildings exceed 
the LMC's height restrictions because the measurements were 
conducted on an arbitrary grade determination, and Legacy should 
have applied for a variance. Legacy had no variance, plaintiffs 
received no notice of an intended variance, and thus the building 
permit was illegal. Plaintiffs argue Legacy's claim that 
plaintiffs knew that Legacy's building permit was issued in July 
2005 when plaintiffs first noticed actual construction is unfair 
and misses the point. That adjoining property owners should be 
able to assume if they do not receive actual notice of the 
intended variance that there is no need for a variance. 
Plaintiffs also argue they were not told that the filing fee was 
required and there was no way they could have known what fee was 
required, so Park City cannot now claim the fee was late. 
Plaintiffs further suggest due process may be implicated by the 
Board's decision, equity should inspire this Court to reverse the 
decisions, and because the buildings violated the LMC height 
restrictions, plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief 
against Legacy. 
Plaintiffs argue Park City's motion to dismiss is untimely 
as it was filed following the filing of Park City's answer, and 
should be stricken. Further, in their cross motion for summary 
judgment, plaintiffs again assert their appeal was timely, that 
Legacy violated the LMC, and that Park.City's decision approving 
the building permit was arbitrary, capricious and/or illegal. 
Pari City 
Park City filed its Answer to plaintiffs' petition on 
October 17, 2006. On February 6, 2007, Park City filed a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. In the motion to dismiss Park City argues under the 
facts plaintiffs allege, or under any set of facts plaintiffs 
could prove in support of their claims, plaintiffs are not 
entitled to relief from this Court. Park City points out that 
plaintiffs challenge several aspects of the Board of Adjustment's 
decision dismissing their appeal, but the Board's conclusion was 
that it had lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Since the LMC 
and Utah Code require appeals to be filed within ten days of any 
final decision, and because the building permit was a final 
decision, plaintiffs' appeal and final filing more than six 
months later was untimely. Park City notes that plaintiffs admit 
these dates and the timing in their own filings in this court. 
Park City notes plaintiffs acknowledge receipt of (and include in 
their filings) a letter of April 5, 2006, received from Patrick 
Putt, Park City Municipal Corporation' s Planning Director, 
informing plaintiffs the final action occurred when the building 
permit was issued and that an appeal required a filing fee. This 
letter, defendants argue, is not the final action, but even if 
the Court finds it to be the final action, plaintiffs still did 
not file their completed notice of appeal with the filing fee 
within the required ten days. The Board found it lacked 
jurisdiction and supported this decision with findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. This decision, Park City arguesr was not 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal but was supported by 
substantial evidence that plaintiffs had filed an untimely 
appeal. 
Park City argues its motion to dismiss is timely and in the 
alternative can be considered a motion for summary judgment. 
Legacy 
Legacy filed a motion for summary judgementr which Park City 
supported, and in which Legacy alleges similar facts to the facts 
alleged by Park City; the process was fair and the appeal 
untimely- Legacy also asserts the following as undisputed facts. 
It is clear from their depositions that plaintiffs are 
sophisticated real estate brokers and as such understand the 
application process for building permits. Plaintiffs knew or 
must have known when they first saw actual construction in 2005 
that a building permit must have been issued but plaintiffs did 
nothing until January of the following year. Legacy asserts that 
plaintiffs' claim the Planning Director's decision was not final 
is untenable. Legacy points out the LMC defines final actions as 
those issued on the latter of taking a final vote or writing a 
decision on a matter and only on appeal is a deciding body 
required to adopt and execute written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on a matter. Legacy thus argues the building 
permit was a final written decision and plaintiffs had ten days 
to appeal from that decision. To refute plaintiffs' other claims 
that equity justifies this Court's consideration of plaintiffs' 
appeal Legacy argues the Court would set a dangerous precedent if 
it found the issuance of a building permit was not a final 
action. It should be final because builders heed to rely on 
something before they invest the time and other resources into 
construction. Without the guarantee that after the ten days have 
lapsed a permit can be relied on as final, there is no incentive 
to commence building. Legacy also argues plaintiffs7, claims 
regarding due process claims and whether a variance was required 
confuse substance with procedure, and only procedure is properly 
before this Court and the Court does not have the jurisdiction to 
consider substantive issues. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
LAND MANAGEMENT CODE & UTAH CODE ANN. RULES & PROCEDURES 
The Park City Land Management Code (LMC) establishes city 
regulations for the health, safety and welfare of Park City's 
inhabitants, businesses, and visitors. It sets forth building 
regulations and requires submission and approval of all building 
permits by the Planning, Engineering and Building Departments 
before they are valid. LMC § 15-1-8 (A) . The LMC only requires 
notice of land use decisions to be made at public hearings. LMC 
§§ 15-1-12. With public hearings, notice may be sent to adjacent 
homeowners, however such ^[c]ourtesy notice is not a legal 
requirementr and any defect in courtesy notice shall not affect 
or invalidate any hearing or.action by the City Council or any 
Board or Commission." LMC § 15-1-12 ( c). Although plaintiffs 
have not alleged they are part of homeowner's association, when 
such associations desire notice of building permit applications 
within their boundaries, they must first register with the Park 
City Building Department and file an annual fee. LMC § 15-1-
12(F)(1)-
A final action in the initial phases of land management 
decisions occurs when a deciding body does the latter of a taking 
a final vote or writing a decision on a matter. LMC §§ 15-15-
1.90. That definiti on is what drives this courtrs decision. 
During appeals to the Planning Commission and Board of 
Adjustment, finality occurs when the deciding body executes 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the appeal or 
reconsideration. LMC § 15-1-18(N). 
Any property owner within three hundred feet of a site has 
standing to appeal a final action of the Board and ^[a]ll appeals 
must be made within ten (10) calendar days of the Final Action." 
Id.
 f at §§ (D) and (E). An appellant must also file the 
applicable fee on appeal. Id.
 r
 a
"t §(F). Any decision by the 
Planning Director regarding the LMC's application to a property 
may be appealed to the Planning Commission. LMC § 15-1-18(A). No 
review of such decisions may occur until all applicable fees have 
been paid. LMC § 15-1-8 (B). Following the Planning Commission's 
appellate decision the next appeal is to the Board of Adjustment. 
Id., at § ( c). Any adversely affected person may then petition 
the district court for review of the Board of Adjustment's final 
actions, but a condition precedent to district court review is 
that the appeal of the administrative decision was accomplished 
in accordance with local ordinances. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9a-
-9--
701 and 703 (2005). MIn the absence of an ordinance • establishing 
a reasonable time to appeal, an adversely affected .party shall 
have ten calendar days to appeal to an appeal authority a written 
decision issued by a land use authority." Utah Code Ann, § 10-9a-
704 (200 6). Once a party has exhausted its administrative 
remedies and a court is faced with an appeal of a municipality's 
land use decision, the court ^shall . . „ presume that a 
decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of 
this chapter is valid; and determine only whether or not the 
decision, ordinance or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(i)-(ii)(2005). A final 
decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid 
if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Utah Code 
Ann. 10-9a~801(3) ( c) . XAA municipality's land use decisions are 
entitled to a great deal of deference." Springville Citizens for 
a Better Cmty. v. City of Springviller 1999 UT 25, 1 23 (1999) . 
DISCUSSION 
This case requires the court to interpret a local ordinance. 
The definition of final decision favors defendants. 
The initial question before this court is procedural, 
whether plaintiffs'" complaint is appropriately before this court. 
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The answer determines whether the court will address the petition 
and subsequent filings on substantive grounds or dismiss the 
petition on procedural grounds. 
The LMC requires a person with standing to file an appeal 
within ten calendar days of a final decision. If the LMC did not 
require an appeal within ten days the Utah Code would, or at 
least state statute allows a minimum time of ten days. Plaintiffs 
filed a notice of appeal January 19, 2006r six months after the 
decision to approve Legacy's building permit. Plaintiffs filed a 
filing fee several months later. 
The court finds plaintiffs' arguments they could not 
establish if a filing fee was required ar'g unpersuasive as 
plaintiffs were in contact with Park City and could.-have easily 
established, what the fee. was when they determined the LMC 
required a notice of appeal. Where timely notice is the only 
jurisdictional requirement to initiate an appeal, it is true that 
notice alone may initiate an appeal. See Raiser v. Buirleyr 2002 
UT Ap 277, 16. However, the case before the court is 
distinguishable from those cited by plaintiffs. The LMC provides 
requirements for an appeal, one of which is payment of a filing 
fee. Unlike the rules of appellate procedure there is no 
requirement to refuse a notice of appeal without a filing fee. 
See Utah R. App. P. 3(f) (stating x'[t]he clerk of the trial court 
shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is 
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paid.")- In contrast the LMC requires that an applicant "shall 
pay the applicable fee" LMC § 15-1-18(F). Plaintiffs delayed in 
filing the fee even when it is undisputed they knew one was 
required, they waited twenty days from the receipt of a letter 
officially informing them a filing fee was required before filing 
it. Finally, a filing fee could have been included with 
plaintiffs' notice of appeal and it would have still been 
untimely. 
On balance, however, the court does not believe that the 
failure to pay the filing fee defeats plaintiffs'" claims The 
original notice of appeal filed in January 2006 is taken as'the 
operative date by the court. 
A building permit to this court, based on the LMC and policy 
considerations, clearly constitutes a final action as defined by 
the LMC. One prepares for and applies for a building permit and 
waits to begin construction in the good faith belief that once it 
is approved a building permit authorizes construction according 
to the .application". Speculation in building permits is not 
favored and would create great mischief. ™[T]he economic- waste 
that occurs when a project is halted after substantial costs have 
been incurred in its commencement is o£ no benefit either to the 
public or to•landowners." Western Land Equities v. Logan, Gil 
P.2d 388, 395 (Utah 1980). It is also clearly the intent of the 
LMC that parties should rely on building permits as Legacy's 
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building permit could be revoked for failure to proceed with due 
diligence if it had not commenced construction in a timely manner 
after issuance of the permit. See LMC §§ 15-1-14 and 15-1-17. 
Plaintiffs argue Legacy's building permit was not a final 
action because it was issued without notice to adjoining 
landowners or written findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
Host importantly, plaintiffs have and had no practical way of 
obtaining notice and thus they may be deprived of a ^ right" 
without fundamental fairness, without notice. While that 
argument has a. certain surface appeal, any Mright'A plaintiffs 
have is created by the LMC and to attempt to redress a claimed 
wrong that same LMC must be strictly adhered to. Plaintiffs1 
argument ignores the LMC's requirements for notice.and its 
distinctions between finality requirements at different levels _ of 
decision-making. Written findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are only required if a final action is taken at the appellate or 
reconsideration level. In contrast, an initial staff decision (to 
issue or not issue a building permit) is final when the latter of 
a vote or a written decision is issued on a matter. An 
application is filed to build X and if that is approved, a permit 
is issued, a final decision on the application to build X. When 
the Planning Director issued Legacy's building permit this was 
its final action that any aggrieved person then had ten days to 
appeal. The LMC also requires notice for public hearings, not to 
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general homeowners when building permits are applied for at the 
planning department level. Even when notice is required for 
public hearings, notice to adjoining landowners is not a strict 
requirement, and failure to give adjoining owners courtesy notice 
does not affect or invalidate any hearing or action by the City 
Council or any Board or Commission. As a practical matter there 
is no way to notify everyone that may be "interested" in all 
building permits. On balance, a policy that favors the builder 
over neighbors is not one this court has power to change. 
Plaintiffs' depositions make clear they are sophisticated in 
construction building permits and the application process. It is 
implausible to the court that with this knowledge and background 
plaintiffs waited because they did not understand the building 
permit process. Plaintiffs'" claimed actual discovery of the 
alleged violations is not the marker of a final action under any 
reading of established law. However, the court is rejecting the 
argument, sound in principle though it is, that notice is the 
touchstone of fairness in this area. .Even with ^sophisticated" 
knowledge, the ordinance scheme (and all others like it) do not 
favor the nearby landowner who wants to challenge a building 
permit. Whether intentional or not, any builder may simply get a 
building permit, wait ten days, then commence building. The time 
to appeal that permit would have expired, as it did here. Thus, 
here, even though these plaintiffs could have taken action 
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sooner, the building permit is a public record. Obviously Park 
City, and most other municipalities and counties and the State of 
Utah itself, have made a policy decision to favor the 
builder/developer so that upon receipt of a building'permit, that 
builder may commence work with an assurance that the expenditure 
of work and money will not be challenged at any time in the 
future that someone believes an error was made or an ordinance 
has been violated. These plaintiffs are not completely without 
any remedy as a private action alleging a violation of zoninq. 
ordinancesr or nuisancer or some other theory imaginable by 
plaintiffs may be pursued. The written issuance of a building 
permit is the final action in this case and under the Park City 
LMC. 
Park City's appellate decisions all issued with findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, determining plaintiffs' appeal 
untimely. The district court must presume such ^ appellate" 
decisions are valid unless they are arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal. The decision that a building permit is final is well-
supported and reasonable in that building permits would be 
worthless if they could not be relied upon as final once the 
period for objections or appeals passed- The final action taken 
by the Board of Adjustment was supported with substantial 
evidence detailing the timing and course of plaintiffs' appeal 
and justifying its decision to dismiss the appeal as untimely. 
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Plaintiffs have alleged nothing that shows the decisions to deny 
their appeal on procedural grounds is arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal. On the contrary, that decision was not arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal. The material facts, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to plaintiffs, make clear to this court that 
as a matter of law Legacy is entitled to summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs argue that because this building permit was not a 
final decision, this court does not apply the standard of review 
and procedures of MLUDMA, but rather merely examines the 
decisions of the Board of Adjustment to see if that decision is 
legal. 
Even if this court used that standard, the court has 
indicated above that it believes the issuance of a building 
permit under the LMC is a final decision. Thus, if the court is 
asked to merely determine if the decision of the Board is 
'"legal," the court determines. it was legal because the building 
permit was a final .decision and the appeal from its issuance was 
not timely. 
Plaintiffs argue Park City's motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is untimely and 
should be dismissed. The court agrees Park City's motion is 
untimely and should have been filed before its answer, or 
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alternatively as a motion for summary judgment or a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. However the Court will not dismiss it. 
The rules and case law on how to handle improper motions to 
dismiss give this court wide discretion. Rule 12 permits the 
court to treat the motion as one for summary judgment. In a 
motion to "dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, [if] matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the. 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). If no matters 
outside the pleadings are considered: 
[A]fter the answer is filed it is incorrect to file a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), [however] 
even the case relied on by the plaintiff recognizes 
that the incorrectly filed Rule -12(b)(6) motion can be 
converted into a Rule 12( c) motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. . . .Rule 12(h)(2) allows a defense of 
failure to state a claim to be raised in a Rule 12( c) 
motion for judgment on the pleadings even though the 
motion was wrongfully filed after the answer as a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. . . .So long as matters 
outside the pleadings have not been submitted, the 
standard, for evaluating a Rule 12( c) motion for 
judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as 
the standard for evaluating a Rule 12(b) (6) motion. . 
In other words, all facts stated in the pleadings of 
the nonmoving party are assumed to be true- and all 
inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 
M&M Fuel Co. v. U.S., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1373, 2-4 (D. Kan. 
1991). Consequently, the court will consider Park Cityfs untimely 
motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. No 
substantive matters outside the pleadings were submitted. Thus in 
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considering Park Cityrs motion, the court assumes all facts in 
the petition are true and makes all inferences in favor of 
plaintiff. With this in mind, under the appropriate legal 
standards and conclusions stated above in considering the motion, 
the court finds there is no possibility plaintiff could prevail 
on the facts asserted or on any facts plaintiffs could develop to 
support their claims. Plaintiffsr appeal was untimely and the 
procedural rules governing untimely appeals are strict. 
Legacy's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
Park City's Motion to Dismiss, or Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings, is GRANTED. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
This Order'is the Order of the Court and no other order is 
required. 
DATED this 2007. 
BY JTHE^OrotT:/ 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HUDSON and MASTANEH BRETT, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS, 
LEGACY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, 
Defendant. 
RULING axid ORDER 
Case No. 050500458 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE; December 14, 2005 
The above matter came before the court on December 12, 2005, 
for oral argument on defendant's motion to dismiss.. Plaintiff 
was present through Chris Wangsgard and defendant was present 
through Eric P. Lee. Defendant filed this motion on October 31, 
2005* Plaintiff filed an opposition response on November 17", 
2005, Defendant filed a reply on November 30, 2005. Oral 
argument was scheduled and held December 12, 2005. The court took 
the matter under advisement. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the 
entire file., and heard oral argument, concludes as follows. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a complaint September 2, 2005. It alleged 
plaintiffs owned property in Park City at 1232 Lowell Avenue, and 
that defendant was beginning to develop property at 1243. Empire 
Avenue, and was planning t:o build three unitsr each of which is 
to be more than 40 feet tall. Under the Park City Land 
1/11/2006 11:23 FAX ©003/01 
Management Code (PC LMC) the maximum height for this zoning is 35 
feet. Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief 
as their view will be impeded if the project goes forward as 
planned by defendant-
Plaintiff also on the same date moved for a preliminary 
injunction. Plaintiffs claim the development of defendant is in 
Park City's Recreation Commercial zone and under the code 15-
2.16-4, the maximum height is 35 feet and the plans submitted for 
a building permit show defendant plans to build three buildings 
each approximately 43 feet tall from the existing grade. The 
approval is a variance and no notice was given. The planned 
structures will interfere with plaintiffs' views. 
After receipt of the motion for preliminary injunctionr the 
court scheduled a telephone conference, which was held November 
3, 2005. The court was advised at that time that a recent motion 
to dismiss had been filed and the court indicated it would hear 
the motion first then consider the preliminary injunction. 
ARGUMENTS 
Defendant moves under Rules 12(b)(1) and (7) to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to join an 
indispensable party. 
Defendant asserts that defendant obtained a building permit 
from Park City-on July 14, 2005, to build three residential units 
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adjacent to plaintiffs' home. Defendant claims under the PC LMC 
that lS^l-lS requires plaintiffs to appeal a decision of the 
community development director to the planning commission. If 
— — * — * ~ " * • — - — - " ^ * 
unsatisfied there, plaintiffs could and must appeal to the Board 
of Adjustment, Dnder the Municipal Land Vse, Development and 
Management Act (MLODiyiA) , OCA 10-9a-801 (1) , failure to exhaust 
remedies leaves this court without jurisdiction. Variances must 
also be challenged by administrative remedy before court action 
is allowed. OCA 10-9 (a)-701. The appeal must be taken or the 
appeal is barred and this action must be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Further, defendant claims Park City is an indispensable 
party under Rule 19(a), URCP. Because defendant has done nothing 
except what was approved by Park City, Park City's interpretation 
of its own ordinance is what is at issue. The court cannot 
conclude Park City erred in its interpretation without hearing 
from Park City. Defendant attaches an affidavit of the managing 
member of defendant to show the date the building permit was 
issued by Park City. 
In opposition, plaintiffs assert Park City is hot an 
indispensable party- Onder the L.C..
 r 15-14-5 ( c ), individuals 
affected by zoning violations have the right to maintain private 
actions without joining the city. 
As to exhaustion, plaintiffs claim Park City did not 
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interpret its own code, but violated it, A building may not be 
more than 35 feet above the grade as it existed at the beginning 
of the project- Plaintiffs claim defendant somehow obtained 
approval of the planning department• 
Plaintiffs claim that only the Board of Adjustment may grant 
a variance, and judicial review of such a decision is permitted, 
Because defendant obtained a variance from the planning 
commission, rather than the Board of Adjustment,, plaintiffs7 
complaint about "the variance is entitled to judicial review, 
Plaintiffs argue that if.defendant is allowed to prevail upon its 
variance, which it obtained without notice, no one could ever 
obtain review as plaintiffs did not know of the variance until 
after the time lapsed for administrative review. Plaintiffs argue 
that if defendant did as plaintiffs allege, and improperly 
obtained a variance, defendant cannot foreclose review by that 
method of keeping ^secret" the variance until the time period for 
appeal lapsed. 
Plaintiffs also argue they are entitled to have the 30 day 
time period tolled, and -the time begins to run when plaintiffs 
had notice of the variance. The 30 day provision applies if a 
municipality conforms to the notice requirements concerning 
variances- If a city does not conform to the notice requirements 
of its own LMC, no otie could know and no review would ever occur. 
Plaintiffs attach the affidavit of Hudson Brett who states 
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he got no notice about the height of the proposed buildings 
defendant was developing, but only learned of the height problems 
in mid August, 2005. 
In reply defendant again argues there were two levels of 
administrative appeal available and plaintiffs pursued neither. 
Plaintiffs are said to have failed to confer jurisdiction on the 
court because of their failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
under UCA 10-9a-801(l) and 10-9a-701(2). 
Whether a variance occurred does not matter because judicial 
review must be from a Board of Adjustment decision concerning a 
variance, and here the decision at issue was made by the 
Community Development Department. Because the Comnvunity 
Development Department made a decision concerning defendant's 
property, an appeal must be taken to the Planning Commission 
under the PC LMC> 
Further, defendant argues that there must be timely 
administrative review and that has not occurred* The PC IMC 
requires appeal within 10 days and the permit was issued July 14, 
2005. Here, even if plaintiff's argument about being foreclosed 
from appeal by secretive action was valid, plaintiffs knew of the 
alleged violation no later than August 8, 2005, and so the appeal 
time was August 18, 2005. This law suit was filed September 2, 
2005, and no appeal was filed administratively. 
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DISCUSSION 
The court agrees with defendant* 
The PC IMC makes clear that an appeal of a Coirtmunity 
Development Department decision must be to the Planning 
Commission. PC LMC 15-1-18- The Board of Adjustment is to hear 
appeals from any Board or person or officer decision 
"administering or interpreting" the LMC. PC LMC 15-10-7.. The PC 
LMC, 15-10-13 provides for judicial review of Board of Adjustment 
decisions. 
Here, there has been no Board of Adjustment decision. 
Judicial review is foreclosed unless a person aggrieved first 
exhausts all available appeals under the municipality's code, 
here the PC LMC, UCA 10~9a-801 (1) . Plaintiffs argue that under 
UCA 10~9a-B01(4) plaintiffs need not comply with the appeal times 
because no notice was given of the granting of a variance. 
However, 10-9a-801(l) provides that a judicial challenge may 
not be brought unless exhaustion occurs. OCA 10-9a-801 (2), only 
the timing of the review is impacted under 10~9a-801(4) if there 
was no notice given by the city under its own code-
Here, r.he court has no record, of course, to review. All 
the court knows is tiu^ w a permit was issued bj the Community 
Development Director and that a judicial review is sought from 
that decision* 
Before judicial review is authorized a municipality must be 
-6~ 
O T / I I / Z O O B 11 : ^ ^ r ™ ©008/011 
given full opportunity to correct its own ^errors" if they have 
been made. It is clearly the intent of the Utah legislature that 
land use decisions not be subject to immediate judicial review 
without the governmental entity having responsibility ultimately 
for that decision to have a chance to fully review the claims. 
That is the entire purpose of OCA 10-9a, Part 7, for 
municipalities to enact their own appeal authority mechanisms. 
Here, the height restrictions of the PC LMC have been 
interpreted or administered. A decision by the Community 
Development Department concerning that height restriction, 
whether plaintiffs call that decision the result of the granting 
of a variance, or whether it is called a ^misinterpretation," or 
whether it is called an ignoring of or violation of the PC LMCr 
that decision is one that is embodied by and encompassed in the 
PC LMC, Therefore, the decision of the Community Development 
Department mucw u^ a^.aied to the Planning Commission^ 
Plaintirfs call v.**c: action a »w*.^-x anuc, and thus argue that 
the judicial review may occur just as if in fact the Board of 
Adjustment had made the decision concerning a variance. The 
court does not agree. Again, MLUDMA requires municipalities to 
enact ordinances setting forth an appeal procedure and 
establishing appeal authorities within the province of the 
municipality.. Those are to be fully exhausted before an appeal 
may lie to a district court. 
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Plaintiffs urge they are not seeking this review under the 
enforcement provision, UCA 10-9a-802, and even if they are, the 
court agrees that the decision at issue is embodied in the LMC 
and so the appeal provisions of 0C& 10-9a-801 must be met before 
judicial review may occur, 
While plaintiff's argument about an inability to meet an 
appeal deadline within the PC LMC (here, 10 days) may have some 
merit in a given case, here there has been no administrative 
appeal filed by plaintiffsr timely or not. After a date certain, 
whether that was August 5 or 8, 2005
 r plaintiffs had actual 
notice of the anticipated height of the buildings defendant was 
constructing. Had plaintiffs sought an appeal of the Community,, 
Development Department, their argument that they appealed as soon 
as they had notice would no doubt have great merit, at least to 
this court* Here, that did not occur, but rather pXaintiffs 
sought judicial review. 
This case is particularly illustrative of the need for 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court has no 
indication as to why the building permit was issued. There may 
or may not be proper reasons, and presumptively there are good 
reasons. Until the city has full opportunity to consider the 
claims of plaintiffs, the court has no jurisdiction to attempt to 
review the basis for the decision-
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or not.
 Ihus, this court h a s no j u r i s a i c t i o n ^ ^ a ^ 
us, decision „ i t h o u t e x h a u s M o n o£ aaffiinlstratlve ^ ^ 
The court n e e d n o t c o n s i d e r ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
exhaustion issue is dispositive. 
The motion to dismiss i s GRANTED, 
This Ruling and Order is the Order 
order is required.. 
DATED this 
of the court and no other 
7 U~ day of-^^i__ r 2005. 
BY/THE^ CO0RT • 
LS / / " ~ 
' BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JU 
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